Electricity supply, deemed contracts, and bulk meter with multiple individual units

INTRODUCTION

In Odeon Arcade Ltd Company v Smartestenegy Business Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1412 ('Odeon Arcade') on 4.11.26, the Court of Appeal (Newey LJ; Falk LJ; Fancourt LJ) gave judgment on the true meaning of 'unoccupied' and 'premises':

(1) when identifying who is a (deemed) party to a deemed contract for the supply of electricity, under paragraph 3(1), Schedule 6 (known as the 'Electricity Code'[1]), contained in Electricity Act 1989; 

(2) where 'electricity is supplied via a bulk meter to a building or complex with multiple occupiers' (paragraph 36)

The judgment is an important one. Odeon Arcade is the first Court of Appeal decision in this area, and it offers welcome guidance on this difficult area. Newey LJ gave the lead judgment (with which, Falk LJ and Fancourt LJ agreed, with Fancourt LJ giving a concurring judgment).

Odeon Arcade in the Court of Appeal was a second appeal. The case had been: 

(1) at first instance, before Deputy ICC Judge Agnello KC (the 'ICC Judge')[2]; and then

(2) on first appeal, before Cawson J (the 'Judge')[3]. 

The Court of Appeal disagreed with both the ICC Judge's judgment and the Judge's judgment (in a sense, showing how difficult paragraph 3(1) was to interpret). 

The facts 

On 25.6.21, Odeon Arcade Ltd ('Odeon') the 'Owner') acquired 1-9 Odeon Arcade (the 'Arcade')(paragraph 3), shopping arcade with a walkway through the middle (paragraph 4); 

Part of the Arcade consisted of Units 8a, 9a and 12, 3 retail units (the '3 Units'). At all material times (13.7.21 to 30.4.23 - the 'relevant Period')), it seems to have been accepted that each of the 3 Units was the subject of a (separate) tenancy agreement. None of the 3 Units was vacant during that period (paragraph 3). In the basement to the Arcade, there was a single electricity meter (the 'Bulk Meter'), through which, during the relevant Period, the relevant electricity supplier ('Smartest') supplied electricity (paragraph 4) to:

(a) the 3 Units;

(b) the basement (itself); and

(c) 'the communal areas of the Arcade including supplies to its lighting, shutters and fire alarms' (paragraph 4).

The basement itself was taken to be unoccupied and undemised (paragraph 4)[4]. Somebody (not Odeon Arcade nor licensed suppler; likely Odeon Arcade's predecessor in title) had installed sub-meters downstream of the Bulk Meter, with indications '...that they had been used to measure electricity supplied to each of Units 8a, 9a and 12 as well as the communal areas of the Arcade.' (paragraph 5). There was evidence that sub-meters were 'usually installed by landlords so that they may recover charges from tenants through a service charge mechanism' (paragraph 5).

Nobody entered into an actual contract with Smartest for the supply of electricity to the Bulk Meter. 

In time, Smartest alleged that Odeon owed it money (c.£100,000) for the electricity supplied to the Bulk Meter. More specifically, Smartest alleged that, pursuant to the Electricity Act 1989, Schedudule 6, paragraph 3(1), a deemed contract had arisen, between Smartest (as electricity supplier) and Odeon (as owner, and/or as occupier)(i.e. that each was a contractant to a deemed contract), and that, under the deemed contract, Odeon became contractually obliged to pay Smartest for the electricity supplied to the Bulk Meter.

Odeon Arcade did not pay.

Subsequently, Smartest presented a creditors winding-up petition against Odeon, on the basis that Odeon was owed Smartest c.£100,000, for electricity supplied to the Bulk Meter (which it called the Supply Premises)(the 'Petition'). The Petition stated that: (a) Odeon was liable to Smartest "pursuant to a contract deemed in the circumstances prescribed by paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 of the Electricity Act 1989 (as amended) by virtue of [Odeon] being an owner and/or occupier of the Supply Premises"; and (b) that sum was due in respect of charges for Smartest's supply of electricity to Odeon at [the 3 Units] at Odeon Arcade, for the relevant Period (paragraph 2);

In response, Odeon applied for orders: (a) restraining advertisement of the Petition; and (b) dismissing the Petition (the 'Application'). The Application was made on the basis that the Petition debt was disputed. Odeon denied liability on the basis (amongst others) that: (a) the 3 Units comprised the "Supply Premises"; and (b) the 3 Units had all "been occupied by tenants under statutory periodic tenancies or written tenancies" during the relevant period. That being so, Odeon maintained, it was not party to a deemed contract with Smartest (paragraph 6).

MAIN PROVISIONS

The Electricity Act 1989, Schedule 6, paragraph 3 is entitled 'Deemed contracts in certain cases' and subparagraph 3(1) reads:

'Where an electricity supplier supplies electricity to any premises otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, the supplier shall be deemed to have contracted with the occupier (or the owner if the premises are unoccupied) for the supply of electricity as from the time (“the relevant time”) when he began so to supply electricity.'

As will be apparent, Parliament has, by enacting a paragraph 3(1) above, determined that where an electricity supplier supplies electricity to a premises, other than pursuant to an (actual) contract, the occupier or owner (as the case maybe - as to which/when, see below) of the premises, should be deemed to have entered into a (deemed) contract with the electricity supplier, for that supply of electricity. With a (deemed) contract deemed to exist, the electricity supplier is contractually entitled to be paid, by the other party of the (deemed) contract, for the electricity supplied, in the usual way. For those unfamiliar Electricity Code deemed contracts, should consider reading first this general article on deemed Gas and Electricity contracts, here. Perhaps also Newey LJ's description of the statutory framework[4a].

There are obviously a number of key words in this provision, 'premises' and 'unoccupied' being two key words. Also, relevant is 'owner' and 'occupier'.

In terms of applicable statutory definitions:

(1) there is a definition of 'premises', which, while helpful, does not provide an answer for all situations. It is that, '...unless the context otherwise requires... '“premises” includes any land, building or structure'[5];

(2) there is no statutory definition of “occupier” or “owner” (Laverty, paragraph 20)[6].

Note, this applies to where there is an 'electricity supplier'. Where: (a) the supply is not made by an 'authorised supplier'; (b) but is conveyed to the occupier/owner by an 'electricity distributor'; and (c) a supply of electricity so conveyed has been previously made by an electricity supplier, paragraph 3(2) may apply instead (see exact wording of paragraph 3(2)[7])

The meaning then of these key words, is a matter of statutory construction, is governed by well known and established principles (see footnote[8]).

SUMMARY 

Odeon Arcade deals with the situation where electricity is: (a) supplied (i) via a single bulk meter; (ii) to a building or complex; and (b) used in distinct areas (some/all being different individual units) with different occupiers (paragraph 31; i.e. where 'electricity is supplied via a bulk meter to a building or complex with multiple occupiers' (paragraph 36))[8a]. It addresses how to determine, who is deemed a party to a (deemed) contract with the relevant electricity supplier under the Electricity Code, paragraph 3(1).

Two key things need to be determined;

(1) what the 'premises' are?

(2) what 'unoccupied' means (since this determines whether or not it is the 'occupier' or the 'owner' who is liable)? 

Firstly, ''premises" refers to the whole of the "land, building or structure" receiving electricity via a bulk meter.' - Newey LJ, at paragraph 34.

Secondly, '...premises are "unoccupied" within the meaning of paragraph 3(1) if there is no single occupier of the entirety.' - Newey LJ, at paragraph 48.

So, the task will be, to:

(1) identified 'the whole of the "land, building or structure" receiving electricity via a bulk meter'; then, 

(2) ask, in relation to that 'premises' just identified, is there a 'single occupier of the entirety'? If there:

(a) is a single occupier of the entirety, then the premises are occupied (not 'unoccupied'), and the 'occupier' is deemed to be in contract with the electricity supplier; 

(b) is no single occupier of the entirety, then the premises are 'unoccupied', and the 'owner' is deemed to be in contract with the electricity supplier; 

The observation can be made, that with a building or complex, in which there are a number of distinct individual units, occupied by different occupiers, the likely answer is that there is no 'single occupier of the entirety', with the result that, the 'premises' will be 'unoccupied' within the meaning of that word in paragraph 3(1), and so, the 'owner' will be deemed to have entered into a (deemed) contract with the electricity supplier. 

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 

The circumstances of Odeon Arcade were: electricity was: (a) supplied via a single bulk meter; and (b) used in distinct areas with different occupiers (paragraph 31). The issue was how does paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code apply.

Observations on the scenario

In reaching his conclusion on how paragraph 3(1) was suppose to operate, Newey LJ made some observations. He considered:

(1) when such a situation might arise. At paragraph 31, Newey LJ referred to two case and the circumstances in reach. He said:

'As East Tower Apartments Ltd v No.1 West India Quay (Residential) Ltd and King v Residential Marine Ltd show, examples can include a block containing numerous flats and a mobile home park.'

(2) where the location of the single bulk meter might be.

(a) on a practical level, where it might be. Newey LJ said, at paragraph 31:

'When considering how paragraph 3(1) works in such cases, it needs to be borne in mind that a bulk meter can potentially be in a place to which the owner alone has access; in the common parts of a building or complex; in somewhere the subject of a demise or licence in favour of a person other than a landlord (say, a particular flat in a converted house); attached to the outside of a relevant building; or situated away from anywhere using the electricity (say, in an outbuilding or even, perhaps, on land owned by a highway authority).'

(b) on a legal level, where it is permitted to be. Newey LJ said, at paragraph 31: '...paragraph 1(3) of schedule 7 to the 1989 Act allows a meter to be placed "outside [the customer's] premises or in some other position".' 

Newey LJ added 'To complicate matters further, it is possible to envisage cases in which management functions are being exercised by an RTM company pursuant to the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.' (paragraph 31)

(3) the key words, in paragraph 3(1) - namely, 'premises' 'occupier' and 'unoccupied', and their importance. At paragraph 32, Newey LJ said: 'The meaning of the words "premises", "occupier" and "unoccupied", as used in paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code, is of key importance.'

Newey LJ explained the meaning of each of the words, as follows:

(a) Premises

As to 'premises', Newey LJ said:

'With regard to the first of these,... a person who "supplies electricity to any premises" needs to be licensed unless an exemption applies and that "premises" include "any land, building or structure". Linkage to "premises" can also be seen in section 4(4) of the 1989 Act, which defines "supply" by reference to "supply to premises".' (paragraph 32)

and that

'Paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code speaks of an electricity supplier "suppl[ying] electricity to any premises".' (paragraph 33). 

Newey LJ looked at 2 approaches (set out below), namely:

(i) the approach of the first instance judge's (ICC Judge); and

(ii) British Gas',

and found that neither were correct ('My own view is that neither the ICC Judge's approach nor that of British Gas is correct.' - paragraph 34).

In doing so, Newey LJ in Ocean Arcade held that 'premises' does not mean:

(i) the individual units (rather than their totality), as the first instance judge (the ICC Judge) had apparently held ('she took the "premises" in the present case to be the individual units receiving electricity, not their totality.' - paragraph 33). 

(ii) the particular premises, wherein the bulk meter is situated (or, perhaps, the area immediately around the point where electricity supply enters the relevant building or complex), on the basis that there are multiple 'premises' - one for each of the individual units receiving the electricity. Newey LJ said, at paragraph 33:

'For its part, British Gas also proceeds on the basis that, in the case of a building or complex in which a number of units receive electricity via a bulk meter, there are multiple "premises". It appears to view the relevant "premises" as those including the particular place in which a bulk meter is sited (or, perhaps, the area immediately around the point where electricity supply enters the relevant building or complex).'

Rather, Newey LJ concluded that the correct meaning of 'premises', in paragraph 3(1), is that 'premises' refers to '...the whole of the "land, building or structure" receiving electricity via a bulk meter.' (paragraph 34).

Newey LJ explained, at paragraph 34:

'It seems to me that, read naturally, "premises" refers to the whole of the "land, building or structure" receiving electricity via a bulk meter. Take a case in which electricity supplied by a licensed supplier through a bulk meter located in the common parts of a block of flats is used by the various occupiers of the flats as well as in the common parts. The licensed supplier would, I think, fairly and ordinarily be seen as supplying electricity to the whole building, not just the spot where the bulk meter happened to have been placed or individual flats. It is to be remembered in this connection that paragraph 1(1) of schedule 7 refers to supply being given "through" a meter rather than "to" one and that, as is apparent from paragraph 1(3), a meter can potentially be placed "outside [the customer's] premises or in some other position", confirming that the location of a bulk meter cannot be equated with the "premises" supplied. Given, moreover, the general requirement on licensed suppliers to supply through, and ascertain consumption by, a meter, there can surely be no question of Parliament having intended paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code to bring into being multiple deemed contracts between a supplier and individual occupiers. Where there is no more than one approved meter (viz. a bulk meter), a licensed supplier can measure only total usage, not consumption by particular occupiers.'

(b) Unoccupied and Occupier

Concept and approach to analysis

Newey LJ considered these words together. Newey LJ made a number of points about: (a) the concept of 'occupation'; and (c) how to approach understanding its role in a particular legal framework/regime. He noted that:

(1) in Graysim Holdings Ltd v P & O Property Holdings Ltd [1996] AC 329, Lord Nicholls explained, at 334, that 'the concept of occupation is not a legal term of art, with one single and precise legal meaning applicable in all circumstances' and that '[i]ts meaning varies according to the subject matter';

(2) in Cornerstone Telecommunications Infrastructure Ltd v Compton Beauchamp Estates Ltd [2022] UKSC 18, [2022] 1 WLR 3360, wherein, one issue was as to the meaning of "occupier" in the Electronic Communications Code, Lady Rose went so far as to say, in paragraph 106:

'the starting point here is not to try to define the word 'occupier' and then allow that definition to mandate how the regime established by the code works. The correct approach is to work out how the regime is intended to work and then consider what meaning should be given to the word 'occupier' so as best to achieve that goal.'; and

(3) 'there must be many contexts in which it would not be appropriate to conclude that a building or complex of which at least parts had occupiers was "unoccupied".'

At paragraph 36, Newey LJ then asked himself:

'How, then, was the regime relating to deemed contracts intended to work in a case in which electricity is supplied via a bulk meter to a building or complex with multiple occupiers? Where, say, a bulk meter serves a block containing a number of flats leased to individual occupiers, who will Parliament have intended to be liable for electricity charges?'

Possible interpretations 

Newey LJ in Odeon Arcade then:

(1) went through 3 possible interpretations of occupation (paragraphs 37 to 39), dismissing each in turn as not the correct understanding (3 possible interpretations, and their respective dismissals, are set out in a footnote[9]);

(2) recorded:

(a) electricity supplier's (Smartest's) submission:

'On [the electricity supplier's] case, it would be the owner of the building or complex who would be liable to pay for all the consumption recorded by a bulk meter.'

(b) the owner's response to this submission:

'[Counsel for the owner] submitted that that would be both unjust and absurd. The 1989 Act, he argued, seeks to place liability on those who consume electricity, and an owner need not have consumed any, let alone that of the entire building or complex. An owner could also say with reason that the 1989 Act does not make it obvious that owners can be liable for the usage of an entire building or complex notwithstanding that some or all of it has occupiers.' 

(3) expressed his support for 'throwing the deemed liability onto the owner' (paragraph 41), where a building or complex served by a bulk meter has more than one occupier. He reasoned such an approach

(a) would be rational. Newey LJ's said, at paragraph 41:

'Where...a building or complex served by a bulk meter has more than one occupier, a rational case can be made for throwing the deemed liability onto the owner. The owner can typically be expected to know whether the whole building or complex is served by the bulk meter and, if not, which parts of it are so served; to be aware of who is in occupation and on what basis; and to be in a position to establish arrangements under which different occupiers pay for their individual usage. An owner might, for example, choose to install sub-meters. The fact that sub-meters appear to have been found in the Arcade suggests that a predecessor of Odeon may have done just that.'

(b) would fit with the concept that the deemed contract was imposed as a substitute for an actual contract being form, where the only plausible candidate for entering into such an actual contract, would be the owner (landlord). Newey LJ's said, at paragraph 42:

'A further point is that, as can be seen from the Ofgem workgroup report quoted in paragraph 20 above, a deemed contract such as paragraph 3 of the Electricity Code provides for is intended to take the place of an actual contract when, say, a customer has moved out. Where such a situation arises with, for example, a block of flats, the only plausible contracting party would be the landlord: no individual tenant is going to be willing to take on liability for the supply to the whole block. That tends to suggest that a substitute under paragraph 3 should similarly be with the landlord.'

(4) expressed his doubts that the Electricity Code, paragraphs 2, 6 7, really supported the Judge interpretation of paragraph 3(1) (as the Judge thought). Newey LJ said, at paragraph 43 '...the Judge considered that support for his interpretation of paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code might possibly be found in other provisions of the Code. In that connection, he referred to paragraphs 2, 6 and 7.' Newey LJ proceeded to looked at those Electricity Code provisions, in reverse order:

(i) as to Electricity Code, paragraph 7(5), Newey LJ said, at paragraph 44:

'...paragraph 7(5) of the Electricity Code provides that "[a] power of entry for the purpose of removing or installing an electricity meter may not be exercised unless at least two working days' notice has been given to the occupier (or the owner of the premises if they are unoccupied)". [Counsel for the electricity supplier's] approach to paragraph 3(1) would imply that, where there is a bulk meter serving a block of flats, notice need be given only to the landlord.

However, Newey LJ's said that that '...does not strike me as an absurd outcome. It is far from evident that Parliament would have wanted a licensed supplier wishing to replace a bulk meter to have to give notice to every occupier of every flat, especially since (a) the meter might well be in an area controlled by the landlord and (b) the supplier would not necessarily know how the building was divided up or occupied.' (paragraph 44)

(ii) as to Electricity Code, paragraph 6, Newey LJ said, at paragraph 45:

'Turning to paragraph 6 of the Electricity Code, sub-paragraph (1) makes it an offence to damage (or allow to be damaged) an electric line, plant or meter intentionally or by culpable negligence and sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) state as follows:

"(2) Where an offence has been committed under sub-paragraph (1) by the occupier of any premises (or by the owner of the premises if they are unoccupied when the offence is committed) in relation to any electric line or electrical plant provided by an electricity distributor for making or maintaining a connection to the premises, the distributor may disconnect the premises.

(3) Where an offence has been committed under sub-paragraph (1) in relation to an electricity meter provided by an electricity supplier which is situated on any premises, by the occupier (or by the owner of the premises if they are unoccupied when the offence is committed), the supplier may disconnect the premises and may remove the meter."

The Judge commented in paragraph 62 of the Judgment that Smartest's interpretation of paragraph 3(1) "would mean that if a tenant committed the relevant offence, the powers under paragraphs 6(2) and (3) would not arise, which does not make a great deal of sense".

However, Newey LJ's view that '...it is not clear why a supplier should be permitted to disconnect the whole of a building or complex just because an occupier of one part has committed an offence.' (paragraph 45)

(ii) as to Electricity Code, paragraph 2, Newey LJ said, at paragraph 46:

'With regard to paragraph 2 of the Electricity Code, sub-paragraph (1) entitles a supplier to install a pre-payment meter or disconnect the premises if a "customer" has not paid and sub-paragraph (2) provides:

"The power of a supplier under sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b) may not be exercised-

…

(b) unless not less than seven working days' notice has been given to the occupier of the premises (or the owner of the premises if they are unoccupied) of his intention to exercise it."

The Judge observed in paragraph 61 of the Judgment that "one would logically expect the legislation to be designed to ensure that notice was given to the parties most directly affected by the disconnection of supply, namely the party in occupation actually using the electricity".'

As to this, Newey LJ said:

'While, however, there is some force in this point, it is not so powerful as to cause me to reject [counsel for the electricity supplier's] interpretation of paragraph 3(1). Apart from anything else, it might be thought sensible that a supplier should merely have to notify the party with the legal liability and, very possibly, control of the relevant meter rather than having to attempt to give notice to numerous, and potentially unidentifiable, occupiers of particular parts of the premises.'

Conclusion on 'unoccupied'

While showing some sympathy with the Judge's interpretation[10], Newey LJ favoured a different interpretation. Newey LJ said that,

'...construing the words used in the light of their specific context and purpose, I have concluded that premises are "unoccupied" within the meaning of paragraph 3(1) if there is no single occupier of the entirety.' (paragraph 48)

Owner 

Newey LJ did accept one difficulty would remain, following his judgment. That is, where different parts of a complex served by a bulk meter have different owners. Who would be the 'owner' and what would the position be. Newey LJ said, at paragraph 47:

'It is fair to say that adopting [counsel for the electricity supplier's] interpretation of paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code may not provide a clear answer to every question which could arise in relation to the provision. There could, for example, be issues as to who is an "owner" or what the position is where different parts of a complex served by a bulk meter have different owners. I would guess, though, that bulk meters are far more likely to be used where there is only one owner.'

So this issue was left open, with just a observation that the issue is not likely to arise much, as bulk meters are far more likely to be used where there is only one owner.

On the facts

On the facts, Newey LJ concluded that '....indebted to Smartest as alleged in the winding-up petition'. Accordingly:

(a) correctly interpreted, paragraph 3(1) had made Odeon a (deemed) contractant to a deemed contract with the electricity supplier, Smartest, for the relevant Period; and,

(b) Odeon ought to have paid, but had not, and so the Petition correctly alleged that Odeon was indebted to electricity supplier, Smartest, for the c.£100,000.

SIMON HILL © 2026*

BARRISTER

33 BEDFORD ROW

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[1] Strictly speaking it is called 'The public electricity supply code'. Schedule 6 of the Electricity Act 1989 ('EA 1989') is given effect to by s.24 of the EA 1989, which is entitled ‘The public electricity supply code.’ and reads ‘The provisions of Schedule 6 to this Act (which relate to the distribution and supply of electricity) shall have effect.’

In Laverty v British Gas Trading Ltd [2014] EWHC 2721 (Ch), under the heading 'The Gas Code and the Electricity Code', Etherton C described these provisions as follows (Gas - paragraphs 14- 15, and Electricity - paragraphs 19 to 20):

'14. Schedule 2B to the Gas Act contains the Gas Code. Paragraph 8(1) provides as follows so far as relevant:

“Where a gas supplier supplies gas to a consumer otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, the supplier shall be deemed to have contracted with the consumer for the supply of gas as from the time … when he began so to supply gas to the consumer”.

15. The term “consumer” is defined in paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 2B to mean “a person who is supplied with gas conveyed to particular premises… by a gas transporter”.

...

19. Schedule 6 to the Electricity Act 1989 contains the Electricity Code. Paragraph 3 (1) provides as follows so far as relevant:

“Where an electricity supplier supplies electricity to any premises otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, the supplier shall be deemed to have contracted with the occupier (or the owner if the premises are unoccupied) for the supply of electricity as from the time … when he began so to supply electricity.”

20. There is no statutory definition of “occupier” or “owner” for the purposes of the Electricity Code.'

[2] The following summary is taken from an earlier article on this subject. Because Deputy ICCJ Agnello KC's judgment was overruled by the Court of Appeal, this summary is only of academic interest.

At first instance, in Odeon Arcade Ltd Company v Smartestenegy Business Ltd [2025] EWHC 571 (Ch) (overruled), Deputy ICCJ Agnello KC on 19.3.25 heard an application by the Applicant company (alleged debtor; Odeon) for an injunction, prohibiting the Respondent (alleged creditor; Smartestenergy) from advertising a winding up petition (the 'Petition') the Respondent had presented against the Applicant. The Petition was founded upon an alleged debt of c.£106,000 (the 'Petition Debt'), alleged to be due for electricty under a deemed contract between the Applicant and Respondent. The Applicant contended that alleged Petition Debt was genuinely disputed on substantial grounds (which was sufficient to obtain the injunction).

Though the test was whether or not the Applicant had raised a genuine dispute on substantial grounds as to whether the Petition Debt was owed (very similar to a summary judgment threshold), the Court recognised that there was a short point of law at the heart of the dispute. Under the heading 'The Law', the Deputy ICC Judge said, at paragraph 5:

'As to the approach adopted in summary judgment applications and the court being able to determine a short point of law, I was referred to the following passage from ICI Chemicals v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725 (Lord Justice Moore -Bick):

‘12. In my view the judge should have followed his original instinct. It is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better.’'

The basic facts were:

'The [Applicant] is the freehold owner of 1 to 9 Odeon Arcade, Leicester LE1 5HJ (‘the Arcade’) since [13.7.21]. The Arcade is divided into various commercial units. The [Respondent] is a supplier of electricity and in particular has supplied electricity to the Arcade. The petition claims charges for the supply of electricity for the period [13.7.21 to 30.4.23] in relation to Units 8A, 9A and 12 of the Arcade. ... there is one meter for the supply of electricity at the Arcade, at least in relation to Units 8A, 9A and 12, despite the Arcade being divided up into various units. According to the [Applicant], those three units were occupied by commercial tenants during the supply period as follows:-' (paragraph 8)

The details for each of the three units is then set out. In essence, each was leased and occupied during the contested period (13.7.21 to 30.4.23). Continuing with the factual basis:

'...there was one meter which supplied the electricity to Units 8A, 9A and 12 of the Arcade. The supply was disconnected on [20.2.23] because the [Respondent] had not received payment for the supply from the period [13.7.21] to [20.2.23]. According to [a witness for the Respondent], the [Respondent’s] position is that none of these tenants can be described as a single ‘occupier’ of the supply of electricity to the premises. He states that these tenants ‘merely occupy or occupied’ discrete units within the supply premises. Accordingly, it does not appear that there is any dispute that there are tenants occupying certain units as described in the leases which I have referred to above. The argument between the parties relates to who is liable for the charges which arise from the supply of electricity to the units which form part of the Arcade. I have no evidence relating to other units in the Arcade and whether in fact those units have their own separate supply of electricity. Demands for payment of the electricity charges were made at some stage to [an occupier of Unit 12], but thereafter demands for payments were made to the [Applicant] as the freeholder, as the owner of the Arcade.

The issue of who is liable for the electricity charges is based not on the terms of any contract between the various parties, but arises solely from the deemed contract which the [Respondent] states has arisen under paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 of the Electricity Act 1989. The [Respondent] submits that as there is no single occupier for the entire premises, then under that provision, the owner, being the [Applicant], is liable. This is disputed by the [Applicant] which asserts no such deemed contract has arisen as between itself and the [Respondent].

Under the heading 'The statutory provisions', Deputy ICC Judge recited, at paragraphs 10 to 12:

'Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 of the Electricity Act 1989 states as follows:-

“Where an electricity supplier supplies electricity to any premises otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, the supplier shall be deemed to have contracted with the occupier (or the owner if the premises are unoccupied) for the supply of electricity as from the time (“the relevant time”) when he began so to supply electricity.”

There are other statutory provisions which I was referred to, paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 6 to the Electricity Act 1989:-

“2.— Non-payment of suppliers' charges

(1) Where a customer has not, within the requisite period, [made all the relevant payments], the supplier may–

(a) install a pre-payment meter on the premises; or

(b) disconnect the premises, and the supplier may recover any expenses incurred in so doing from the customer.”

Paragraphs 1(1)-(3) of Schedule 7 of the Electricity Act 1989 set out the requirement to provide electricity supply through a meter:-

“(1) Where a customer of an [authorised supplier] is to be charged for his supply wholly or partly by reference to the quantity of electricity supplied, the supply shall be given through, and the quantity of electricity shall be ascertained by, an appropriate meter.

(2) If the [authorised supplier] agrees, the meter may be provided by the customer [(who may provide a meter which belongs to him or is made available otherwise than in pursuance of arrangements made by the supplier)]; but otherwise it shall be provided by the [authorised supplier] [(who may provide a meter which belongs to him or to any person other than the customer)].

(3) The meter shall be installed on the customer's premises in a position determined by the [authorised supplier], unless in all the circumstances it is more reasonable to place it outside those premises or in some other position.”'

At paragraph 19, the Deputy ICC Judge set out her conclusions. But in preceding paragraphs, while setting out of the arguments, she did intersperse these with some conclusions. It is therefore necessary to set out at length, the Deputy ICC Judge's reciting of the arguments, and her conclusions. She said, at paragraphs 13 to 21:

'13. The [Respondent's] position is that a deemed contract has arisen pursuant to this provision whereby the [Applicant] is liable for the supply of electricity at the premises. I will need to consider the meaning of ‘premises’. The [Applicant] submits that no deemed contract can arise because as the evidence demonstrates, the units are occupied and therefore any deemed contract would be with the occupiers rather than with the [Applicant] as owner of the premises.

14. The [Respondent] submits that the purpose behind paragraph 3(1) is to enable a deemed contract to come into existence when a new occupier arrives on the premises. The [Respondent's] case is that ‘occupier’ in paragraph 3(1) must be read as referring to the occupier of the entire premises. As there is in this case no single occupier of the entire premises, then the owner becomes the party to the deemed contract under paragraph 3(1).

15. Effectively [counsel for the Respondent] submits that a reading of this paragraph asks two questions, (1) what premises are being supplied the electricity and (2) who is the occupier of those premises. This is in reality another way to argue that premises in paragraph 3(1) must be defined as the entire premises. This leads to the submission that the entire premises are not occupied by one occupier but by several occupiers and therefore this means that the owner is liable, relying upon the second part of paragraph 3(1).

16. [Counsel for the Respondent] submits that this construction is supported by certain canons of construction. He submits that an alternative interpretation that all tenants are liable produces absurd or unworkable results. He submits that this could not have been Parliament’s intention that occupants of one unit which is part of the ‘premises’ would be liable for the supply to other units which form part of the entire premises. In my judgment, this unfairness only really exists in so far as ‘premises’ in paragraph 3(1) refers to the entire premises. If the reference to premises is only to the premises which are the subject matter of the lease and the tenant’s occupation, the unfairness asserted would not arise.

17. Secondly, [counsel for the Respondent] submits that the interpretation of all the tenants being liable for the electricity supply to the entire premises cannot be reconciled with the supplier’s statutory right to ‘disconnect the premises’ where the customer has not, within the requisite period, made all the relevant payments. This arises pursuant to paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 6. He submits that the construction that all the tenants are liable for the electricity charges would mean that if part of a bill remains unpaid, then even those who have paid their share would be disconnected. He submits this is an absurd outcome. In my judgment, this point again depends upon the construction of ‘premises’ being a reference to the entire premises. As with the earlier point, [counsel for the Respondent's] construction strains the natural language used in paragraph 3(1) which refers to premises and not to entire premises. It is agreed by the parties that in accordance with the Interpretation Act 1978 the singular refers also to the plural so the provision is to be read as referring to occupier or occupiers. This therefore means that paragraph 3(1) envisages occupiers of premises. Moreover, the ability of the [Respondent] to disconnect when the bill has not been paid is exactly what occurred in this case. It does not lead to an unfair outcome, but allows the [Respondent] to disconnect due to non-payment of the electricity charges to the premises. That is what has occurred in this case.

18. The [Respondent] submits that the purpose of the deeming provision is to address an inefficiency in the energy market which would arise if suppliers have to formally contract with new occupants of buildings every time a building gained a new occupant. There would be a wait before a new occupant could be guaranteed a supply of electricity because of having to wait for a contract with a supplier. I am not persuaded that the mischief is to promote market efficiency or importantly, that the more natural construction which the [Respondent] argues against in some way fails to promote market efficiency. [Counsel for the Respondent] did not provide any real justification to support his purpose and mischief argument as in some way meaning that deeming was necessary in all cases and that a failure to be able to deem in certain cases was against the purpose of the provision. In certain cases deeming may not be appropriate and the supplier would seek to negotiate express contracts. The provision enables contacts to be deemed in certain circumstances which can assist both the supplier and also the occupier, but this will depend on the factual circumstances. In every case, it seems to me, actual contracts can be entered into by way of an alternative. Meters could be installed to the separate units. In this particular case, as the outstanding electricity bill which covered separate units has not been paid for a considerable period of time, the supply was disconnected. It is no part of the [Respondent's] case that in some way it is not possible to install separate meters.

19. In my judgment, the [Respondent's] construction does not accord with the natural meaning of the paragraph. The clause operates primarily to deem a contract between the supplier and the occupiers or occupier of premises. Premises, here, in my judgment, relates to the premises which are occupied by the relevant occupier. There is no justification to seek to read premises as having to relate to the entire premises over which an owner is the freeholder. Under the terms of the paragraph, the owner is only liable under a deemed contract if the premises are unoccupied. That is clearly not the case here. The premises are clearly occupied and therefore that part of the provision does not apply. [Counsel for the Respondent] attempted to argue that it made sense that if the clause was construed as being the entire premises, as no one party occupied the entire premises, then the owner was liable. In my judgment, this proposed construction strains the language used and goes against what is actually written. The proposed construction would mean that despite the premises being occupied, the clause required there to be a fiction that the premises were unoccupied in order to create a deemed contract with the owner.

20. In my judgment, the deemed contract relates to the party who is using the supply. If the premises are occupied, that will be the occupiers. If not occupied, then the owner will be liable under a deemed contract. In a case where there is one adopted meter but many occupiers of different units of the premises, then the supplier has its usual entitlements to disconnect the supply if payment is not made. That is what occurred here after a lengthy period of time. It forms no part of the purpose of the legislation to deem a contract with an owner even though the premises are occupied. That would be, in my judgment, an absurd result.

21. In conclusion, I reject the proposed construction of the [Respondent] and determine that no deemed contract arose between the owner and the supplier. The premises were occupied at all the relevant times and I reject the strained construction relied upon by the [Respondent] for the reasons I have set out above.'

[3] The following summary is taken from an earlier article on this subject. Because Cawson J's judgment was overruled by the Court of Appeal, this summary is only of academic interest.

On first appeal, in SmartestEnergy Business Ltd v Odeon Arcade Ltd [2025] EWHC 2975 (Ch) (overruled), Cawson J on 14.11.25 dismissed an appeal against Deputy ICCJ Agnello KC's decision. Cawson J said '...the Judge was right to find that Odeon did not become liable under a deemed contract imposed by paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 to the 1989 Act, and therefore that Odeon was not liable to pay for the electricity supply which was the subject matter of the Petition. The Judge was therefore entitled to restrain SBL from giving notice of or advertising the Petition, and correct to dismiss the Petition.' (paragraph 63). In reaching this decision, Cawson J said that he had not been persuaded that electricity supplier's (SBL) submissions '...lead to the right conclusion' (paragraph 44)

Under the heading 'Determination', Cawson J said, at paragraphs 45 to 62:

'I consider it important to focus upon the fact that the key issue is as to whether Odeon, as an “owner” of “premises” is subject to a deemed contract because the “premises” are to be regarded as “unoccupied” for the purposes of paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 to the 1989 Act. The key word to be interpreted is “unoccupied”, albeit that such word requires to be interpreted in context, and by reference to, amongst other things, the purpose behind the paragraph 3(1), the Electricity Code as a whole within Schedule 6, and the other provisions of the 1989 Act.

As to the interpretation of “unoccupied”, the issue is as to whether it is limited to meaning unoccupied in the ordinary sense of nobody occupying the whole or any part thereof, or whether the meaning also extends to include, as contended by SBL, the situation in the present case where the whole is not occupied as a whole, but individual units making up the whole are occupied by individual occupants.

I take the point made by reference to what was said by Lady Rose JSC in Cornerstone Telecommunications v Compton Beauchamp (supra) at [106] that the particular word or expression sought to be interpreted should be informed by the purpose or intention behind the legislation, rather than the other way round, and that one does need to consider how the deemed contract regime provided for by paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 was intended to work, and the purpose behind it, before fixing on the meaning of “unoccupied”, or indeed the meaning of “premises” or “occupied”.

However, the starting point in statutory interpretation remains to consider the ordinary meaning (or meanings if there are more than one) of a word or phrase. As the passage from Regina (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department at [29] referred to in paragraph 26 above demonstrates, there is good constitutional reason for this in the importance of citizens, with the assistance of their advisers, being able to rely upon what they read in an Act of Parliament in seeking to understand what Parliament has enacted.

It is certainly true that the expression “occupied”, and therefore the expression “unoccupied”, might have different meanings according to the context. However, as a matter of ordinary parlance, it does, I consider, strain the language, if not contradict it, to describe premises that are occupied by a number of tenants, enjoying separate demised premises, as unoccupied. Indeed, as a matter of the application of the ordinary meaning of words, I find it difficult if not impossible to say that any part of the premises served by the relevant meter in the present case was “unoccupied” given that tenants were in occupation of the three units thereat.

As the authorities that I have been referred to demonstrate, a recognised canon of construction is the rule against absurdity, and therefore the courts will lean against a construction of legislation which produces absurd or unworkable results, if there is an available alternative construction which does not do so.

I regard it as a moot point as to whether, in the present case, an interpretation that might actually contradict the ordinary meaning of “unoccupied” is an “available alternative construction”. However, I am not persuaded that the interpretation as found by the Judge to be the correct interpretation does produce such an absurd or unworkable result that one is required to adopt an interpretation of the word “unoccupied” that at best strains the ordinary meaning of that word, and at the worst contradicts it.

The construction contended for by SBL certainly produces a more certain result so far as the operation of paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 is concerned, and one that is more helpful to electricity suppliers in a situation such as the present where it can simply proceed against the owner of the relevant premises in the event of non-payment for electricity charges. However, that is rather different from an absurd or unworkable result.

The other keywords within paragraph 3(1) are “premises” and “occupier”. If the interpretation contended for by SBL is rejected, then there are, as I see it, three possibilities:

i) Firstly, the position as found by the Judge, namely that “premises” means the individual premises or units demised to the tenants who were, respectively, the occupiers thereof and liable as such for the electricity supplied to their premises;

ii) Secondly, that the “premises” are the whole of the premises served by the relevant electricity meter, with the consequence that there was only one deemed contract with all three tenants that had the effect of making them jointly and severally liable to SBL for the electricity supplied to the premises as a whole; or

iii) Thirdly, a possibility not covered in submissions, namely the “premises” are the whole of the premises served by the relevant electricity meter there and was one deemed contract was with the three tenants, but it was an implied term of that deemed contract that the tenants should only be personally liable to SBL for the electricity that they actually used. This would be on the basis that such a term of the deemed contract was to be implied by necessary implication.

Each of these scenarios, including the one as found by the Judge to be the correct analysis, does give rise to potentially difficult apportionment exercises as between the respective tenants, but does not, I consider, produce an absurd result or an unworkable one. ... the courts are used to having to apportion liability where necessary to do so.

Further, I consider it important to bear in mind that the present case provides something of an extreme example or edge case, with the invoices sent to Odeon remaining unpaid for a significant period of time without any objection with regard to its liability to pay being made by Odeon, for whatever reason. In this respect, I note that there is a dispute between the parties with regard to whether Odeon did, in fact, receive the relevant invoices. It says not, with matters only coming to a head after the Petition had been presented.

However, in most cases, one would expect matters to come to a head very much more quickly. Had Odeon objected more promptly, as one would expect would ordinarily be the case, then liability could have been asserted as against the individual tenants leading to a practical solution being achieved through either the provision of separate meters to the respective demised premises, or some arrangement come to as between the tenants as to how bills were to be shared. I note in this context the powers within the legislation to force a meter upon a user of electricity on threat of disconnection in paragraph 1 of Schedule 7 to the 1989 Act.

In particular, paragraph 1(5) of Schedule 7 provides that:

“(5) If the customer refuses or fails to take his supply through an appropriate meter provided and installed in accordance with sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above, the supplier may refuse to give or may discontinue the supply.”

This provision thus anticipates a situation where electricity is being supplied to a customer who does not have an individual meter, and effectively allows the supplier to say that unless a meter is installed, then the supply will be discontinued.

So far as the townhouse example is concerned...'

I interpose here, paragraph 39:

'[Counsel for SBL] used as an example to demonstrate his point the example of a townhouse split into a number of rooms or flats that are let out, with only one meter serving the house. He submitted that it would be wholly impractical if anyone apart from the landlord/owner were the party to the relevant deemed contract given the difficulties that would be created if the occupiers of the individual rooms or flats were a party to the relevant deemed contract, either individually or jointly and severally.'

Continuing with paragraph 59:

'...I would have thought it unlikely, in the real world, that problems regarding the operation of paragraph 3(1) would often arise. In practice, if the premises as a whole are served by only one meter, then one would have thought that the tenants are likely to have had in place an arrangement between themselves as to how electricity was to be paid for, or that there was an arrangement that the landlord would pay the bills and recoup the same through a higher rent or a service charge. It is difficult to see that tenants would commonly take a tenancy of part of a townhouse of the kind identified by [counsel for SBL], or indeed any other premises, unless one of these regimes were in place.

In short, I consider that the practical considerations that are said by SBL to support its interpretation of paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 6 are overstated, and that they are insufficient to lead to the conclusion that the court should adopt a construction of the word “unoccupied” that does, frankly, do significant violence to the language of paragraph 3(1).

Further, ... other provisions of Schedule 6 to the 1989 Act, and elsewhere in the 1989 Act do, if anything, support the Judge’s interpretation. With regard to paragraph 2(2)(a) of Schedule 6, one would logically expect the legislation to be designed to ensure that notice was given to the parties most directly affected by the disconnection of supply, namely the party in occupation actually using the electricity. Similar considerations arise in respect of paragraph 7(5) of Schedule 6, relating to the power of entry on the part of an electricity supplier to enter premises to remove or install a meter. Again, provision is made for notice to be given to “the occupier (or the owner of the premises if they are unoccupied)”.

A further marked example is paragraph 6 of Schedule 6. Paragraph 6(1) creates an offence where a person intentionally or by culpable negligence damages or allows to be damaged any electrical line or electrical plant provided by electricity distributor, or an electricity meter provided by an electricity supplier. Paragraph 6(2) and (3) provide that where such an offence has been committed under paragraph 6(1), then the distributor or supplier (as appropriate) may disconnect the premises, and in the case of the supplier remove the meter. However, this is expressed to be the case where the offence has been committed by “the occupier of any premises (or by the owner of the premises if they are unoccupied when the offence is committed).” If SBL is correct in its interpretation, then this would mean that if a tenant committed the relevant offence, the powers under paragraphs 6(2) and (3) would not arise, which does not make a great deal of sense.'

[4] In Odeon Arcade Ltd Company v Smartestenegy Business Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1412, Newey LJ said:

'The evidence suggests that the Bulk Meter was in a part of the premises which it served (viz. the basement) and that Odeon occupied that area....On top of that, it seems very possible that Odeon occupied the walkway at the Arcade and that that area, too, was served by the Bulk Meter.'

[4a] In Odeon Arcade Ltd Company v Smartestenegy Business Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1412, under the heading 'The statutory framework', Newey LJ said, at paragraphs 12 to 21:

'Section 4 of the 1989 Act makes it an offence for a person to supply electricity to any "premises" unless authorised to do so by a licence granted under section 6. However, section 5 empowers the Secretary of State to grant exemption from that prohibition, and the Electricity (Class Exemptions from the Requirement for a Licence) Order 2001 exempts among others, under Class B, persons who "do not supply any electricity except … electricity which is supplied to their premises by … a licensed supplier [i.e. the holder of a licence under section 6]". Section 64 explains that the term "premises" "includes any land, building or structure".

In 2020, the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy ("BEIS") launched a call for evidence in relation to exemptions from section 4. In "Exemptions from the Requirement for an Electricity Licence, Call for Evidence", published on 30 October 2020, the Department said that it was its understanding that the exemptions were mainly used by "stakeholders supplying various types of development, both domestic and commercial, including shopping centres, residential developments, student accommodation, mobile home parks, ports, airports, industrial sites including energy intensives" and that the Class B exemption is used "in the resale of electricity via tenancy agreements by landlords and others". In "Reselling Gas and Electricity, Call for input", published on 9 October 2025, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, Ofgem, noted that "Energy resale occurs when an intermediary, such as a landlord, park-home owner or marina operator, purchases electricity or gas from a licensed supplier and then resells it to consumers".

Such arrangements came before the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) in East Tower Apartments Ltd v No.1 West India Quay (Residential) Ltd [2016] UKUT 553 (LC) and King v Residential Marine Ltd [2021] UKUT 0309 (LC). The former case concerned a building of 32 floors containing a hotel and 158 residential apartments. As was explained in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the decision, electricity was supplied to the building as a whole, metered by two bulk meters, and sub-meters had been installed to measure consumption in different areas, including the hotel, the common parts, the car park and the individual apartments. The latter case involved a marina which included a mobile home park. Electricity was supplied to the marina under a contract with its owner and resold to occupants of mobile home pitches.

Section 44 of the 1989 Act empowers the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority ("GEMA"), by which Ofgem is governed, to set maximum prices at which electricity may be resold. On 14 March 2014, GEMA directed pursuant to section 44 that, where electricity is resold for domestic use, or for use in any form of accommodation, "the maximum price at which each unit ... of electricity may be resold shall be the same as that paid to the authorised supplier by the person reselling it". Where metering equipment facilitating resale of electricity on that basis is not available, "the maximum resale price shall be estimated with the objective that each person to whom … electricity is being resold by a particular reseller will pay a fair proportion of the overall costs incurred by the reseller, including any standing charge, but excluding a fair proportion of the costs representing electricity … consumed in relation to common parts".

Schedule 7 to the 1989 Act is concerned with meters. By paragraph 1(1), where a customer of either a licensed supplier or a person with the benefit of an exemption is to be charged for his supply wholly or partly by reference to the quantity of electricity supplied, the supply "shall be given through, and the quantity of electricity shall be ascertained by, an appropriate meter". Paragraph 1(3) states that such a meter "shall be installed on the customer's premises in a position determined by the authorised supplier, unless in all the circumstances it is more reasonable to place it outside those premises or in some other position".

Paragraph 1 (1A) of schedule 7 derogates from paragraph 1(1), providing that a supply may be given otherwise than through an appropriate meter in such circumstances as may be prescribed. The Electricity (Unmetered Supply) Regulations 2001, made pursuant to paragraph 1(1A), allow an unmetered supply to be given if "the electrical load is of a predictable nature" and either the load is less than 500W or "it is not practical for a supply of electricity to be given through an appropriate meter at the premises" for one of the reasons specified in paragraph 3(1)(b)(ii).

Provision for deemed contracts was introduced into the 1989 Act by the Utilities Act 2000 as part of the Electricity Code. "A Fair Deal for Consumers, Modernising the Framework for Utility Regulation", published by the Department for Trade and Industry in 1999, explained that it was "intended to provide in electricity for deemed contracts based on the Gas Act model" with the purpose of "address[ing] the situation where a supply is taken without there being an express contract in place for that supply and a supplier is responsible for the cost of that supply, by virtue of the organisation of the wholesale market for electricity". The reference to the "Gas Act model" related to the Gas Act 1986, which provided for deemed contracts for the supply of gas. As amended in 2000, the 1989 Act can be seen to have been inspired by the Gas Act 1986 although the relevant provisions do not correspond precisely.

As its heading ("Deemed contracts in certain cases") indicates, paragraph 3 of the Electricity Code deals with deemed contracts. Paragraph 3(1), which is central to the present appeal, states:

"Where an electricity supplier supplies electricity to any premises otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, the supplier shall be deemed to have contracted with the occupier (or the owner if the premises are unoccupied) for the supply of electricity as from the time ("the relevant time") when he began so to supply electricity."

An Ofgem workgroup commented in a 2006 report ("Deemed Contracts – Final report from Duty to Supply, Contracts and Information workgroup"):

"deemed contracts play a vital role in the energy market. The nature of supply is such that it would be inefficient, given current metering technology, to disconnect premises when a customer had moved out and reconnect the premises upon application for a contract by a new occupant. In addition, suppliers may not always be aware of customer movements until a period of time has elapsed after the event. A deemed contract therefore seeks to provide a sound and binding basis upon which suppliers will supply customers where a contract has not been expressly agreed. It also provides suppliers with a clear basis upon which to charge for that supply."

Elsewhere in the Electricity Code provision is made for, among other things, circumstances in which an electricity supplier may install a pre-payment meter, disconnect premises or enter premises.'

[5] Schedule 6 of the Electricity Act 1989 ('EA 1989') is given effect to by s.24 of the EA 1989, which is entitled ‘The public electricity supply code.’ and reads ‘The provisions of Schedule 6 to this Act (which relate to the distribution and supply of electricity) shall have effect.’

Section 24 appears in Part I of the EA 1989. Also in Part I, is s.64, entitled ‘Interpretation etc. of Part I.’. Section 64 (1) reads (so far as material):

‘(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires…

“premises” includes any land, building or structure;’

This, itself, benefits from statutory definition. The word ‘land’ is defined in Interpretation Act 1978 ('IA 1978'), Schedule 1:

(i) Schedule 1 of the IA 1978 was brought into effect by s.5 of the IA 1978. Section 5 of the IA 1978 is entitled 'Definitions' and reads:

'In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, words and expressions listed in Schedule 1 to this Act are to be construed in according to that Schedule.'

(ii) The definition of 'land' has a date after it. This means it applies to any Act of Parliament made after the date specified (see Schedule 2, para. 4 of IA 1978). The date next to the definition of 'land' is 1 January 1979. Given EA 1989 was (obviously) passed after 1 January 1979, this definition of 'land' is applicable to EA 1989; 

(iii) the definition of 'land' then, in Schedule 1, IA 1978, is as follows:

‘“Land” includes buildings and other structures, land covered with water, and any estate, interest, easement, servitude or right in or over land.‘

So, 'unless the context otherwise requires' x 2 (see below), in Sch.6, para.3(1):

(i) the 'owner' of 'premises', is the 'owner' of any land, building or structure, where ‘land’ here, includes buildings and other structures, land covered with water, and, any estate, interest, easement, servitude or right in or over land. A freehold interest is an ‘estate, interest, easement, servitude or right in or over land’. A leasehold interest is an ‘estate, interest, easement, servitude or right in or over land’.

(ii) the 'occupier' of 'premises' is the occupier of any land, building or structure (inc. land covered by water), with 'land' defined as per Schedule 1 of the IA 1978.

Section 64 of the EA 1989 commences with 'unless the context otherwise requires...'. Section 5 of the IA 1978 also contains 'unless the contrary intention appears,' The question is, what does this mean? In London Corp v Cusack-Smith [1955] AC 337 [1955] 2 WLR 363, at page 363 (speaking of whether, in Town and Country Planning Act 1947, a definition in s.119, applied to s.19), Lord Reid said:

'Before it could be held that "the context otherwise requires," it would, in my view, be necessary to show not only that the application of the definition leads to a result which Parliament cannot be supposed to have intended but also that, if the definition is excluded, the result will be a more reasonable result which Parliament can be supposed to have intended.'

[6] In Laverty v British Gas Trading Ltd [2014] EWHC 2721 (Ch), Etherton C said, at paragraph 20:

'There is no statutory definition of “occupier” or “owner” for the purposes of the Electricity Code.'

[7] In the Electricity Act 1989, Schedule 6, paragraph 3, there is subparagraph 3(2), which provides:

'Where-

(a) the owner or occupier of any premises takes a supply of electricity which has been conveyed to those premises by an electricity distributor;

(b) that supply is not made by an authorised supplier; and

(c) a supply of electricity so conveyed has been previously made by an electricity supplier,

the owner or occupier shall be deemed to have contracted with the appropriate supplier for the supply of electricity as from the time (“the relevant time”) when he began to take such a supply.'

To determine who is the 'appropriate supplier', reference needs to be made to subpargraph 3(4), which reads:

'The Authority shall publish a document containing provision for determining the “appropriate supplier” for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2).'

The 'Authority' is defined by section 3A of the Electricity Act 1989. Section 3A(1) provides:

'The principal objective of the...Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (in this Act referred to as “the Authority”)...'

(the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority was established under section 1 of the Utilities Act 2000)

For completeness, Electricity Act 1989, Schedule 6, paragraph 3 also provides the following relevant subparagraphs to paragraph 3:

'(5) The Authority may revise the current document published under sub-paragraph (4); and where it does so it shall publish the revised document.'

And

'(3) Nothing in sub-paragraph (2) shall be taken to afford a defence in any criminal proceedings.'

And

'(6) The express terms and conditions of a contract which, by virtue of sub-paragraph...(2), is deemed to have been made shall be provided for by a scheme made under this paragraph.

(7) Each electricity supplier shall make (and may from time to time revise), a scheme for determining the terms and conditions which are to be incorporated in the contracts which, by virtue of sub-paragraph... (2), are to be deemed to have been made.'

The above subparagraph 3(7) is the same as for a scenario falling with subparagraph 3(1). Also the same, is subparagraph 3(8) and 3(9):

'The terms and conditions so determined may include terms and conditions for enabling the electricity supplier to determine, in any case where the meter is not read immediately before the relevant time, the quantity of electricity which is to be treated as supplied by the supplier to the premises, or taken by the owner or occupier of the premises, during the period beginning with the relevant time and ending with-

(a) the time when the meter is first read after the relevant time; or

(b) the time when the supplier ceases to supply electricity to the premises, or the owner or occupier ceases to take a supply of electricity,

whichever is the earlier.

A scheme under this paragraph may (subject to section 7B) make different provision for different cases or classes of cases, or for different areas, determined by, or in accordance with, the provisions of the scheme.'

Section 7B of the Electricity Act 1989 is entitled 'Uniform prices etc. in certain areas of Scotland'

[8] In Odeon Arcade Ltd Company v Smartestenegy Business Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1412, Newey LJ said, at paragraph 30:

'Statutory interpretation involves "seeking to ascertain the meaning of the words used in a statute in the light of their context and the purpose of the statutory provision": Darwall v Dartmoor National Park Authority [2025] UKSC 20, [2025] AC 1292, at paragraph 15, per Lords Sales and Stephens. As Lord Hodge observed in R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3, [2023] AC 255, at paragraph 29, "Words and passages in a statute derive their meaning from their context". There are, moreover, "numerous authoritative statements in modern case law which emphasise the central importance in interpreting any legislation of identifying its purpose": Rossendale BC v Hurstwood Properties (A) Ltd [2021] UKSC 16, [2022] AC 690, at paragraph 10, per Lords Briggs and Leggatt. "The purpose and scheme of an Act of Parliament provide the basic frame of orientation for the use of the language employed in it": R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28, [2023] 1 WLR 2594, at paragraph 41, per Lord Sales.'

[8a] In other words, where there is a building or complex, in which there are a number of distinct individual units, occupied by different occupiers, receiving electricity via a single bulk meter.

[9] In Odeon Arcade Ltd Company v Smartestenegy Business Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1412 ('Odeon Arcade'), Newey LJ said, at paragraph 37:

'The Judge identified three possibilities in the paragraphs of the Judgment quoted in paragraph 23 above.'

In paragraph 23 of Newey J's judgment, Newey LJ had said:

'The Judge went on in paragraphs 53 and 54:

"53. The other keywords within paragraph 3(1) are 'premises' and 'occupier'. If the interpretation contended for by [Smartest] is rejected, then there are, as I see it, three possibilities:

i) Firstly, the position as found by the [ICC Judge], namely that 'premises' means the individual premises or units demised to the tenants who were, respectively, the occupiers thereof and liable as such for the electricity supplied to their premises;

ii) Secondly, that the 'premises' are the whole of the premises served by the relevant electricity meter, with the consequence that there was only one deemed contract with all three tenants that had the effect of making them jointly and severally liable to [Smartest] for the electricity supplied to the premises as a whole; or

iii) Thirdly, a possibility not covered in submissions, namely the 'premises' are the whole of the premises served by the relevant electricity meter there and was one deemed contract was with the three tenants, but it was an implied term of that deemed contract that the tenants should only be personally liable to [Smartest] for the electricity that they actually used. This would be on the basis that such a term of the deemed contract was to be implied by necessary implication.

54. Each of these scenarios … does give rise to potentially difficult apportionment exercises as between the respective tenants, but does not, I consider, produce an absurd result or an unworkable one. As pointed out by Mr Shipley [who was appearing for Odeon], the courts are used to having to apportion liability where necessary to do so."''

Back at paragraph 37 of Newey LJ's judgment (and 38), Newey LJ dismissed the first and third possibilities quickly. He said:

'The first was that individual occupiers are liable for the electricity supplied to their particular premises on the basis that those are the "premises" within the meaning of paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code. As, however, I have already said, it seems to me that the relevant "premises" are the entirety of the property served by a bulk meter.

The third possibility canvassed by the Judge would involve a single deemed contract with all occupiers but with an implied term limiting liability to each individual's personal consumption. Not only, however, might such a scenario give rise to "potentially difficult apportionment exercises", but it would, as it seems to me, be inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme. Licensed suppliers are supposed to use appropriate meters to determine usage, but no such meter would be available to measure the electricity consumption of different occupiers. On top of that, it is difficult to see on what basis the suggested implication would be proper. If it were on the footing that it was required to avoid absurdity, then...that would indicate that the interpretation of the statute necessitating the implication was wrong, not that a term fell to be implied.'

As to the second possibility, Newey LJ dismissed this as well, stating, at paragraphs 39 to 40:

'That leaves the Judge's second possibility: a single deemed contract with all occupiers making them jointly and severally liable for all the electricity supplied to the whole building or complex. I understood [counsel for the owner] to accept that this would be the position on the basis of his construction of paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code, and I agree that that would be the consequence. However, I find it very difficult to see how Parliament can have intended that. Take the block of flats whose electricity is supplied through a single bulk meter. Tenants would surely be horrified were they told that they were liable to the licensed supplier not merely for their own usage but for what everyone else in the block had consumed. They could justifiably complain, moreover, that the legislation had not made it at all plain that they could incur such a liability.'

[10] In Odeon Arcade Ltd Company v Smartestenegy Business Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1412, Newey LJ said, at paragraph 48:

'It is not difficult to understand how the Judge considered his interpretation of paragraph 3(1) of the Electricity Code to be supported by its wording. "Unoccupied" would commonly mean what the Judge took it to signify. However, construing the words used in the light of their specific context and purpose, I have concluded that premises are "unoccupied" within the meaning of paragraph 3(1) if there is no single occupier of the entirety. It follows that Odeon is indebted to Smartest as alleged in the winding-up petition.'