A Pallant v Morgan Constructive Trust (Collatory Case)

The Pallant v Morgan Equity - otherwise known as Pallant v Morgan Constructive Trust

In Dixon v Willan [2022] EWHC 2160 (Ch), at paragraph 12, HHJ Cawson QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) on 26 August 2022 said that the following 'formulation of the relevant principles' (paragraph 12) was 'entirely accurate' (paragraph 12):

i) The equity must relate to specific property that is not at first owned by either of the parties – see Cobbe v. Yeoman's Row Management Limited [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752, per Lord Scott at [37].

ii) The acquiring party and the non-acquiring party must form a common intention that the acquiring party will take steps to acquire the property and if they do so that the non-acquiring party will obtain "some interest in it", which does not have to be a specific proprietary interest (whether legal or equitable) in the land itself. It "just requires that specific property be acquired for the joint benefit of A and B" - see Kilcarne Holdings v. Targetfollow (Birmingham) Limited [2005] EWCA Civ 1355, and Kearns Brothers v. Hova Developments Limited [2012] EWHC 2968, per Edward Bartley Jones QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) at [114] to [119].

iii) The common intention need not be in writing. Nor does the common intention require that there be an arrangement that amounts to a contract capable of specific performance (i.e. because its terms are insufficiently certain or because the arrangement was not intended to be an enforceable contract). However, there is a requirement that the main terms of the arrangement have been agreed between the parties. Further the Pallant v. Morgan equity cannot arise where the agreement is made in arms-length commercial negotiations where the agreement is expressed to be "subject to contract" or where both parties mutually agree or each realise that the arrangement is not legally enforceable since they both plan and intend to enter into a binding agreement in the future - see Banner Homes Group PLC v. Luff Developments Limited [2000] Ch 372, 397-399, Cobbe v. Yeoman's Row Management Limited (supra) at [37], and Generator Developments v. LIDL UK GMBH [2018] EWCA Civ 396, [2018] 2 P& CR 7, per Lewison LJ at [56] to [70].

iv) "In order to be able to invoke the Pallant v Morgan equity it must in my judgment be possible to say that the agreement or understanding in question is one which has been assented to by a person capable of binding the party in question; or who at least has ostensible authority to do so" – see Generator Developments v. LIDL (supra), per Lewison LJ at [82], and Pallant v. Morgan (supra), per Harman J at 47.

v) The Pallant v. Morgan equity will arise if the non-acquiring party can show that in reliance on the acquiring party's assurance or the non-acquiring party's expectation that they would acquire an interest in the land, the non-acquiring party then does something which confers an advantage on the acquiring party in acquiring the property or which is detrimental to the non-acquiring party's ability to acquire it on equal terms - see Banners Homes v. Luff (supra).

vi) The Pallant v. Morgan equity will arise where it would be unconscionable for the acquiring party to keep the property for itself. As it was put in Banners Homes v. Luff (supra) at 398-399, per Chadwick LJ: "It is the existence of the advantage to the one, or detriment to the other, gained or suffered as a consequence of the arrangement or understanding, which leads to the conclusion that it would be inequitable or unconscionable to allow the acquiring party to retain the property for himself, in a manner inconsistent with the arrangement or understanding which enabled him to acquire it … What is essential is that the circumstances make it inequitable for the acquiring party to retain the property for himself in a manner inconsistent with the arrangement or understanding on which the non-acquiring party has acted. Those circumstances may arise where the non-acquiring party was never "in the market" for the whole of the property to be acquired; but (on the faith of an arrangement or understanding that he shall have a part of that property) provides support in relation to the acquisition of the whole which is of advantage to the acquiring party. They may arise where the assistance provided to the acquiring party (in pursuance of the arrangement or understanding) involves no detriment to the non-acquiring party; or where the non-acquiring party acts to his detriment (in pursuance of the arrangement or understanding) without the acquiring party obtaining any advantage therefrom."

vii) The effect of the Pallant v. Morgan equity is that the acquiring party becomes bound by a constructive trust to prevent them from benefitting from their unconscionable breach of the agreement.

viii) Since it is an equitable jurisdiction, the court has a wide discretion as to what remedy it orders, which could include the court declaring that the acquired property is held on trust for the acquiring party and the non-acquiring party jointly, that the property be re-sold and that after the deduction of the expenses of purchase and development that the net proceeds of sale be divided between the parties in equal shares or that the acquiring party holds the property on a constructive trust for both parties to give effect to their informal common intention and/or that the court orders accounts and enquiries and/or that the court makes an award of equitable compensation to one of the parties – see Cobbe v. Yeoman's Row Management (supra) at [30] and Kearns Brothers v. Hova Developments Limited (supra) at [123] to [130]).'

Further Authorities

(1) Singh Bains v Irshad [2025] EWHC 491 (Ch), paragraph 267 to 270[1].

Collatory Case Series

The Collatory Case Series, is an series of bulletins, designed to report that one case which collates the essential principles/propositions of law, for a particular doctrine/area of law. It is not designed as a deep and comprehensive review of an area of law, but to provide that quick 'go to' case.

SIMON HILL © 2024*

BARRISTER 

33 BEDFORD ROW  

NOTICE: This article is provided free of charge for information purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. No responsibility for the accuracy and/or correctness of the information and commentary set out in the article, or for any consequences of relying on it, is assumed or accepted by any member of Chambers or by Chambers as a whole, or the Copyright holder. No attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive review/account of the law in this area. *Copyright is owned by Barrister Search Limited.

[1] In Singh Bains v Irshad [2025] EWHC 491 (Ch), HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) said, at paragraph 267 to 270:

'Another kind of constructive trust is called a Pallant v Morgan equity, after the decision in Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43. In that case the parties (neighbouring landowners) were both concerned to secure a particular piece of land which was up for auction. Pursuant to an agreement before the auction that if the defendant was successful the parties should divide the land in a certain way, the plaintiff did not bid, and the defendant was successful. However, the defendant then refused to divide the land as agreed. Harman J held that it would be a fraud for the defendant to retain all the land. The bid was on behalf of both, and the defendant held the land on trust according to the agreement. In truth, it was what might nowadays be described as a proprietary estoppel on a contingency. It was a promise by the defendant to divide up land if obtained by him in the future between the parties on the basis that the plaintiff had acted to his detriment in not bidding for it.

In Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Development Ltd [2000] Ch 372, CA, this "equity" was extensively discussed. Chadwick LJ, with whom Stuart-Smith and Evans LJJ agreed, said:

"36. It is important, however, to identify the features which will give rise to a Pallant v Morgan equity and to define its scope; while keeping in mind that it is undesirable to attempt anything in the nature of an exhaustive classification. As Mr Justice Millett pointed out in Lonrho v Fayed (No 2), at page 9C, in a reference to the work of distinguished Australian commentators, equity must retain its 'inherent flexibility and capacity to adjust to new situations by reference to mainsprings of the equitable jurisdiction'. Equity must never be deterred by the absence of a precise analogy, provided that the principle invoked is sound. Mindful of this caution, it is, nevertheless, possible to advance the following propositions:

(1) A Pallant v Morgan equity may arise where the arrangement or understanding on which it is based precedes the acquisition of the relevant property by one of those parties to that arrangement. It is the pre-acquisition arrangement which colours the subsequent acquisition by the defendant and leads to his being treated as a trustee if he seeks to act inconsistently with it. Where the arrangement or understanding is reached in relation to property already owned by one of the parties, he may (if the arrangement is of sufficient certainty to be enforced specifically) thereby constitute himself trustee on the basis that 'equity looks on that as done which ought to be done'; or an equity may arise under the principles developed in the proprietary estoppel cases. As I have sought to point out, the concepts of constructive trust and proprietary estoppel have much in common in this area. Holiday Inns Inc v Broadhead may, perhaps, best be regarded as a proprietary estoppel case; although it might be said that the arrangement or understanding, made at the time when only the five acre site was owned by the defendant, did, in fact, precede the defendant's acquisition of the option over the fifteen acre site.

(2) It is unnecessary that the arrangement or understanding should be contractually enforceable. Indeed, if there is an agreement which is enforceable as a contract, there is unlikely to be any need to invoke the Pallant v Morgan equity; equity can act through the remedy of specific performance and will recognise the existence of a corresponding trust. On its facts Chattock v Muller is, perhaps, best regarded as a specific performance case. In particular, it is no bar to a Pallant v Morgan equity that the pre-acquisition arrangement is too uncertain to be enforced as a contract – see Pallant v Morgan itself, and the Time Products case – nor that it is plainly not intended to have contractual effect – see Island Holdings Ltd v Birchington Engineering Co Ltd.

(3) It is necessary that the pre-acquisition arrangement or understanding should contemplate that one party ('the acquiring party') will take steps to acquire the relevant property; and that, if he does so, the other party ('the non-acquiring party') will obtain some interest in that property. Further it is necessary, that (whatever private reservations the acquiring party may have) he has not informed the non-acquiring party before the acquisition (or, at the least, before it is too late for the parties to be restored to a position of no advantage/no detriment) that he no longer intends to honour the arrangement or understanding.

(4) It is necessary that, in reliance on the arrangement or understanding, the non-acquiring party should do (or omit to do) something which confers an advantage on the acquiring party in relation to the acquisition of the property; or is detrimental to the ability of the non-acquiring party to acquire the property on equal terms. It is the existence of the advantage to the one, or detriment to the other, gained or suffered as a consequence of the arrangement or understanding, which leads to the conclusion that it would be inequitable or unconscionable to allow the acquiring party to retain the property for himself, in a manner inconsistent with the arrangement or understanding which enabled him to acquire it. Pallant v Morgan itself provides an illustration of this principle. There was nothing inequitable in allowing the defendant to retain for himself the lot (lot 15) in respect to which the plaintiff's agent had no instructions to bid. In many cases the advantage/detriment will be found in the agreement of the non-acquiring party to keep out of the market. That will usually be both to the advantage of the acquiring party – in that he can bid without competition from the non-acquiring party – and to the detriment of the non-acquiring party – in that he loses the opportunity to acquire the property for himself. But there may be advantage to the one without corresponding detriment to the other. Again, Pallant v Morgan provides an illustration. The plaintiff's agreement (through his agent) to keep out of the bidding gave an advantage to the defendant – in that he was able to obtain the property for a lower price than would otherwise have been possible; but the failure of the plaintiff's agent to bid did not, in fact, cause detriment to the plaintiff – because, on the facts, the agent's instructions would not have permitted him to outbid the defendant. Nevertheless, the equity was invoked.

(5) That leads, I think, to the further conclusions: (i) that, although, in many cases, the advantage/ detriment will be found in the agreement of the non-acquiring party to keep out of the market, that is not a necessary feature; and (ii) that, although there will usually be advantage to the one and co-relative disadvantage to the other, the existence of both advantage and detriment is not essential – either will do. What is essential is that the circumstances make it inequitable for the acquiring party to retain the property for himself in a manner inconsistent with the arrangement or understanding on which the non-acquiring party has acted. Those circumstances may arise where the non-acquiring party was never 'in the market' for the whole of the property to be acquired; but (on the faith of an arrangement or understanding that he shall have a part of that property) provides support in relation to the acquisition of the whole which is of advantage to the acquiring party. They may arise where the assistance provided to the acquiring party (in pursuance of the arrangement or understanding) involves no detriment to the non-acquiring party; or where the non-acquiring party acts to his detriment (in pursuance of the arrangement or understanding) without the acquiring party obtaining any advantage therefrom."

I note that, in the later case of Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, Etherton LJ explained the Pallant v Morgan equity in a quite different way. He said:

"88. It is not necessary to resort to the common intention constructive trust to provide an explanation for the cases in which the Pallant v Morgan equity was, or is said to have been, applied. They can all be explained, and, in my judgment, ought to be explained in wholly conventional terms by the existence and breach of fiduciary duty. In Chattock v Muller Sir Richard Malins V-C held that the defendant had attended the auction as the plaintiff's agent. Similarly, in Pallant v Morgan Harman J held that the defendant's agent bid for lot 16 on behalf of both parties. Holiday Inns, Time Products and Island Holdings were joint venture cases, in which it is to be inferred that the particular nature of the relationship between the joint venturers was such as to give rise to fiduciary duties. In the absence of agency or partnership, it would require particular and special features for such fiduciary duties to arise between commercial co-venturers. It is clear, however, that in special circumstances they can arise: Snell's Equity (32nd ed) at 7-006; Murad v Al-Saraj [2004] EWHC Ch 1235 at [325][341], [2005] EWCA Civ 959. In my judgment, the result in Banner Homes can only properly be explained on that basis."

However, the view of Etherton LJ in that case was a minority one. Arden and McFarlane LJJ both held that it was not open to the court to reinterpret the decision in Banner Homes in the way that Etherton LJ wished. As Arden LJ put it,

"129. However, the reasoning in Banner Homes v Luff Developments Ltd [2000] Ch 372, which Etherton LJ has set out at paragraph 76 above, makes it clear that the ratio of that case is firmly based on a common intention constructive trust. By common intention constructive trust, I mean a constructive trust of the kind enunciated in Gissing v Gissing [1971] Ch 162. The analysis of Banner Homes which I have set out at the start of this paragraph was accepted by Lord Scott in Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1752. The speech of Lord Walker in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 and the joint judgment of Lady Hale and Lord Walker in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 may mean that common intention constructive trusts may be limited in the future to family cases, but I do not consider that that position is so clear as to make it possible at this stage for this court to hold that Banner Homes cannot stand with decisions of the House of Lords and Supreme Court, and to treat the ratio of Banner Homes as not binding on it."'