[1] In Singh Bains v Irshad [2025] EWHC 491 (Ch), HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) said, at paragraph 267 to 270:
'Another kind of constructive trust is called a Pallant v Morgan equity, after the decision in Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43. In that case the parties (neighbouring landowners) were both concerned to secure a particular piece of land which was up for auction. Pursuant to an agreement before the auction that if the defendant was successful the parties should divide the land in a certain way, the plaintiff did not bid, and the defendant was successful. However, the defendant then refused to divide the land as agreed. Harman J held that it would be a fraud for the defendant to retain all the land. The bid was on behalf of both, and the defendant held the land on trust according to the agreement. In truth, it was what might nowadays be described as a proprietary estoppel on a contingency. It was a promise by the defendant to divide up land if obtained by him in the future between the parties on the basis that the plaintiff had acted to his detriment in not bidding for it.
In Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Development Ltd [2000] Ch 372, CA, this "equity" was extensively discussed. Chadwick LJ, with whom Stuart-Smith and Evans LJJ agreed, said:
"36. It is important, however, to identify the features which will give rise to a Pallant v Morgan equity and to define its scope; while keeping in mind that it is undesirable to attempt anything in the nature of an exhaustive classification. As Mr Justice Millett pointed out in Lonrho v Fayed (No 2), at page 9C, in a reference to the work of distinguished Australian commentators, equity must retain its 'inherent flexibility and capacity to adjust to new situations by reference to mainsprings of the equitable jurisdiction'. Equity must never be deterred by the absence of a precise analogy, provided that the principle invoked is sound. Mindful of this caution, it is, nevertheless, possible to advance the following propositions:
(1) A Pallant v Morgan equity may arise where the arrangement or understanding on which it is based precedes the acquisition of the relevant property by one of those parties to that arrangement. It is the pre-acquisition arrangement which colours the subsequent acquisition by the defendant and leads to his being treated as a trustee if he seeks to act inconsistently with it. Where the arrangement or understanding is reached in relation to property already owned by one of the parties, he may (if the arrangement is of sufficient certainty to be enforced specifically) thereby constitute himself trustee on the basis that 'equity looks on that as done which ought to be done'; or an equity may arise under the principles developed in the proprietary estoppel cases. As I have sought to point out, the concepts of constructive trust and proprietary estoppel have much in common in this area. Holiday Inns Inc v Broadhead may, perhaps, best be regarded as a proprietary estoppel case; although it might be said that the arrangement or understanding, made at the time when only the five acre site was owned by the defendant, did, in fact, precede the defendant's acquisition of the option over the fifteen acre site.
(2) It is unnecessary that the arrangement or understanding should be contractually enforceable. Indeed, if there is an agreement which is enforceable as a contract, there is unlikely to be any need to invoke the Pallant v Morgan equity; equity can act through the remedy of specific performance and will recognise the existence of a corresponding trust. On its facts Chattock v Muller is, perhaps, best regarded as a specific performance case. In particular, it is no bar to a Pallant v Morgan equity that the pre-acquisition arrangement is too uncertain to be enforced as a contract – see Pallant v Morgan itself, and the Time Products case – nor that it is plainly not intended to have contractual effect – see Island Holdings Ltd v Birchington Engineering Co Ltd.
(3) It is necessary that the pre-acquisition arrangement or understanding should contemplate that one party ('the acquiring party') will take steps to acquire the relevant property; and that, if he does so, the other party ('the non-acquiring party') will obtain some interest in that property. Further it is necessary, that (whatever private reservations the acquiring party may have) he has not informed the non-acquiring party before the acquisition (or, at the least, before it is too late for the parties to be restored to a position of no advantage/no detriment) that he no longer intends to honour the arrangement or understanding.
(4) It is necessary that, in reliance on the arrangement or understanding, the non-acquiring party should do (or omit to do) something which confers an advantage on the acquiring party in relation to the acquisition of the property; or is detrimental to the ability of the non-acquiring party to acquire the property on equal terms. It is the existence of the advantage to the one, or detriment to the other, gained or suffered as a consequence of the arrangement or understanding, which leads to the conclusion that it would be inequitable or unconscionable to allow the acquiring party to retain the property for himself, in a manner inconsistent with the arrangement or understanding which enabled him to acquire it. Pallant v Morgan itself provides an illustration of this principle. There was nothing inequitable in allowing the defendant to retain for himself the lot (lot 15) in respect to which the plaintiff's agent had no instructions to bid. In many cases the advantage/detriment will be found in the agreement of the non-acquiring party to keep out of the market. That will usually be both to the advantage of the acquiring party – in that he can bid without competition from the non-acquiring party – and to the detriment of the non-acquiring party – in that he loses the opportunity to acquire the property for himself. But there may be advantage to the one without corresponding detriment to the other. Again, Pallant v Morgan provides an illustration. The plaintiff's agreement (through his agent) to keep out of the bidding gave an advantage to the defendant – in that he was able to obtain the property for a lower price than would otherwise have been possible; but the failure of the plaintiff's agent to bid did not, in fact, cause detriment to the plaintiff – because, on the facts, the agent's instructions would not have permitted him to outbid the defendant. Nevertheless, the equity was invoked.
(5) That leads, I think, to the further conclusions: (i) that, although, in many cases, the advantage/ detriment will be found in the agreement of the non-acquiring party to keep out of the market, that is not a necessary feature; and (ii) that, although there will usually be advantage to the one and co-relative disadvantage to the other, the existence of both advantage and detriment is not essential – either will do. What is essential is that the circumstances make it inequitable for the acquiring party to retain the property for himself in a manner inconsistent with the arrangement or understanding on which the non-acquiring party has acted. Those circumstances may arise where the non-acquiring party was never 'in the market' for the whole of the property to be acquired; but (on the faith of an arrangement or understanding that he shall have a part of that property) provides support in relation to the acquisition of the whole which is of advantage to the acquiring party. They may arise where the assistance provided to the acquiring party (in pursuance of the arrangement or understanding) involves no detriment to the non-acquiring party; or where the non-acquiring party acts to his detriment (in pursuance of the arrangement or understanding) without the acquiring party obtaining any advantage therefrom."
I note that, in the later case of Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, Etherton LJ explained the Pallant v Morgan equity in a quite different way. He said:
"88. It is not necessary to resort to the common intention constructive trust to provide an explanation for the cases in which the Pallant v Morgan equity was, or is said to have been, applied. They can all be explained, and, in my judgment, ought to be explained in wholly conventional terms by the existence and breach of fiduciary duty. In Chattock v Muller Sir Richard Malins V-C held that the defendant had attended the auction as the plaintiff's agent. Similarly, in Pallant v Morgan Harman J held that the defendant's agent bid for lot 16 on behalf of both parties. Holiday Inns, Time Products and Island Holdings were joint venture cases, in which it is to be inferred that the particular nature of the relationship between the joint venturers was such as to give rise to fiduciary duties. In the absence of agency or partnership, it would require particular and special features for such fiduciary duties to arise between commercial co-venturers. It is clear, however, that in special circumstances they can arise: Snell's Equity (32nd ed) at 7-006; Murad v Al-Saraj [2004] EWHC Ch 1235 at [325][341], [2005] EWCA Civ 959. In my judgment, the result in Banner Homes can only properly be explained on that basis."
However, the view of Etherton LJ in that case was a minority one. Arden and McFarlane LJJ both held that it was not open to the court to reinterpret the decision in Banner Homes in the way that Etherton LJ wished. As Arden LJ put it,
"129. However, the reasoning in Banner Homes v Luff Developments Ltd [2000] Ch 372, which Etherton LJ has set out at paragraph 76 above, makes it clear that the ratio of that case is firmly based on a common intention constructive trust. By common intention constructive trust, I mean a constructive trust of the kind enunciated in Gissing v Gissing [1971] Ch 162. The analysis of Banner Homes which I have set out at the start of this paragraph was accepted by Lord Scott in Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1752. The speech of Lord Walker in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 and the joint judgment of Lady Hale and Lord Walker in Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 may mean that common intention constructive trusts may be limited in the future to family cases, but I do not consider that that position is so clear as to make it possible at this stage for this court to hold that Banner Homes cannot stand with decisions of the House of Lords and Supreme Court, and to treat the ratio of Banner Homes as not binding on it."'