Determining whether a trust is a sham (Collatory Case)

In Sayers v Dixon [2025] EWHC 1886 (Ch) ('Sayers'), ICC Judge Barber heard an application, wherein (amongst other things) it was alleged that certain declarations of trust, were shams. Under the heading 'Legal Principles: Sham', ICC Judge Barber said, at paragraphs 38 to 47:

'38. In Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, Diplock LJ (at p 802) described a sham as:

‘acts done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create.’

39. As put by Arden LJ in Stone (Inspector of Taxes) v Hitch [2001] EWCA Civ 63 at [66]:

‘The parties must have intended to create different rights and obligations from those appearing from (say) the relevant document, and in addition must have intended to give a false impression of those rights and obligations to third parties’

40. Where the declaration of trust is bilateral, there needs to be a common intention that the assets are to be held otherwise than as set out in the trusts (Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 163 at [187]-[190]), but a party who goes along with a sham neither knowing or caring what he is signing is to be taken as having the necessary intention: Midland Bank v Wyatt [1996] BPIR 288 at 291; Re Esteem Settlement 2003 JLR 188, cited with approval in A v A [2007] EWHC 99 at para [52].

41. A unilateral declaration of trust may be a sham, where the person making it does not intend in fact to divest themselves of their interest in the relevant asset but makes the declaration for the purpose of inducing third parties to believe that they do: Painter v Hutchinson [2007] EWHC 758.

42. The burden of proof is on the party alleging a sham. The standard of proof is the normal civil standard of balance of probabilities: Bhura v Bhura [2014] EWHC 727 (Fam) at [9].

43. The fact that a transaction is artificial does not necessarily make it a sham. However, the fact that a transaction is artificial is a factor that can properly be taken into account when deciding whether it is a sham: National Westminster Bank v Jones [2000] BPIR 1092 at 1102.

44. There is a presumption, even in the case of an artificial transaction, that the parties to what appear to be perfectly proper agreements on their face intend them to be effective, and that they intend to honour and enjoy their respective obligations and rights. That that is so is supported by the fact that an allegation of sham carries with it a degree of dishonesty, and the court should be slow (but not naively or unrealistically slow) to find dishonesty: National Westminster Bank v Jones [2000] BPIR 1092 at 1104.

45. In ascertaining whether a transaction or trust is a sham, evidence of subjective intention is admissible. The court may examine external evidence, including the parties’ explanations and circumstantial evidence, such as evidence of the subsequent conduct of the parties (Hitch v Stone [2001] EWCA Civ 63 at [65] and Midland Bank v Wyatt [1996] BPIR 288 at p 292) and whether the parties are ‘doing one thing and saying another’: Belvedere Court Management Limited v Frogmore Developments Limited [1997] QB 858 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR at 876D-F.

46. On the relevance of subsequent conduct, Neuberger J in National Westminster Bank v Jones [2000] BPIR 1092 explained at 1103:

‘AG Securities [1990] 1 AC 417 … established that, when considering whether a transaction is a sham, the court is not restricted to considering activities which took place before or at the time of the transaction: it is perfectly proper to consider how the parties subsequently acted. In AG Securities [1990] 1 AC 417 at 475E-F, Lord Jauncey said that the defendants contended that:

‘[A]lthough the subsequent actions of the parties may not be prayed in aid for the purposes of construing the agreements they may be looked at for the purpose of determining whether or not parts of the agreement are a sham in the sense that they were intended merely as “dressing up” and not as provisions to which any effect would be given.’

It is clear that Lord Jauncey accepted that contention, because he said at 476G: ‘When subsequent events are looked at the matter becomes even clearer’.

The same view was taken by Lord Oliver of Aylmerton (with whom Lord Ackner expressly agreed – see at 466E) at 469C:

‘[T]hough subsequent conduct is irrelevant as an aid to construction, it is certainly admissible as evidence on the question of whether the documents were or were not genuine documents giving effect to the parties’ true intentions.’

Lord Templeman (with whom Lord Ackner also agreed) concurred’.

A sham trust is void rather than voidable: Hitch v Stone (supra) at para [87]. Even if void, however, it stands until it is set aside.'[1].

In Sayers, at paragraph 216, ICC Judge Barber said:

'As made clear by Bhura v Bhura [2014] EWHC 727 (Fam) at 9 (i) and (ii), it is not a threshold requirement of establishing a sham that the parties should intend the transaction to be of no effect at all; simply that they should intend to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between them legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) that they intend to create.' (words in bold are in italics in original).

Though ICC Judge Barber then said, in Sayers, at paragraph 217:

'Ultimately, however, in the context of this case, any debate on whether a given transaction may be found to have been a sham and to fall foul of s423 is largely academic.'

Further Authorities

(1) in Michael v Michael [2024] EWFC 463, a family remedies case, HHJ Edward Hess addressed the law in this area[2];

(2) in Islam v Islam [2024] EWHC 1082 (Ch), in the High Court, Rajah J considered the law on shams[3];

Collatory Case Series

The Collatory Case Series, is an series of bulletins, designed to report that one case which collates the essential principles/propositions of law, for a particular doctrine/area of law. It is not designed as a deep and comprehensive review of an area of law, but to provide that quick 'go to' case.

SIMON HILL © 2025*

BARRISTER 

33 BEDFORD ROW  

NOTICE: This article is provided free of charge for information purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. No responsibility for the accuracy and/or correctness of the information and commentary set out in the article, or for any consequences of relying on it, is assumed or accepted by any member of Chambers or by Chambers as a whole, or the Copyright holder. No attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive review/account of the law in this area. *Copyright is owned by Barrister Search Limited.

[1] In the author's view, the final sentence 'Even if void, however, it stands until it is set aside.' seems counterintuitive, and questionable.

[2] In Michael v Michael [2024] EWFC 463, a (family) financial remedies case, HHJ Edward Hess, under the heading 'Sham and/or Nullity and/or Hoax' said, at paragraphs 109 to 114:

'The document which purports to be the trust deed (5-5) suggests that the date of its creation was 16th July 2007. Its settlor is said to be Christofis. The Trustees are said to be Proglobal Trustees Limited. The first recital asserts that "The Settlor wishes to make this Settlement, by the Execution of this Deed of Trust, as to make certain provisions for the Beneficiaries as herein provided". The current Beneficiaries are said to be A, B and the Red Cross (plus any future child of the husband, of which there are none at present). The Protector is the husband, who has the power to veto the addition of any further beneficiaries.

In analysing the genuineness and validity of this document and this situation, it is important at this stage for me to remind myself of the words of Munby J (as he then was) in A v A & St George Trustees [2007] EWHC 99:-

"Even in the Family Division, a spouse who seeks to extend her claim for ancillary relief to assets which appear to be in the hands of someone other than her husband must identify, and by reference to established principle, some proper basis for doing so. The court cannot grant relief merely because the husband's arrangements appear to be artificial or even 'dodgy'."

Further, the law must be the same in a family court as it is in a court of chancery: see, for example, Thorpe LJ in Goldstone v Goldstone [2011] EWCA Civ 39.

The law of sham is often said to be crystallised in the 'canonical' passage from the judgment of Diplock LJ in Snook v. London & West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, when he said:

"As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the transactions between himself, Auto-Finance, Ltd. and the defendants were a "sham", it is, I think, necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept is involved in the use of this popular and pejorative word. I apprehend that, if it has any meaning in law, it means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the "sham" which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. One thing I think, however, is clear in legal principle, morality and the authorities (see Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co. v. Maclure ((1882) 21 Ch D 309); Stoneleigh Finance, Ltd. v. Phillips ([1965] 1 All ER 513, [1965] 2 QB 537), that for acts or documents to be a "sham", with whatever legal consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating."

Another helpful source of information as to what this means is to be found in the judgment of Birss J (as he then was) in JSC Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426, which includes the following passage:-

"Despite the frequent references to a "sham trust", there is not really any such thing. What may or may not be a sham are the acts or documents which purport to set up the trust. The famous passage on sham in the judgment of Lord Diplock in Snook v London and West Riding Investments [1967] 2QB 786 …The same point was made in New Zealand Official Assignee v Wilson [2008] 3 NZLR 45 at paragraphs 48/49: "The two situations (valid trust and sham trust) do not fall into combination. The finding that the purported trust is void as a sham does not amount to an invalidation of a trust. It is not the trust as such which is a sham. There is no trust to be a sham. It is the trust documentation that is the sham. To find that a document is a sham, the focus is on the intentions of the relevant parties. In Hitch v Stone [2001] STC 214 at paragraph 66 Arden LJ put it this way: "The test of intention is subjective. The parties must have intended to create different rights and obligations from those appearing from (say) the relevant document, and in addition they must have intended to give a false impression of those rights and obligations to third parties."

In the course of the trial [counsel] frequently used the words 'nullity' and 'hoax' to describe how he wished to categorise the situation, and the word nullity appears in the pleadings, although no authority was cited to confirm that there are in reality different categories of causes of action, one being sham and one being nullity. In the end I have taken the view that the use of these synonymical nouns does not really add anything to a proper legal analysis, other than perhaps colour and rhetorical flourish. What I am really analysing here is whether or not the allegation of sham is made out.'

[3] In Islam v Islam [2024] EWHC 1082 (Ch), Rajah J, under the heading 'Sham' and subheading 'Law' said, at paragraphs 136 to 147:

'136. The classic statement of a sham is to be found in Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 per Diplock LJ at 802:

"it means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the 'sham' which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. One thing I think, however, is clear in legal principle, morality and the authorities …, that for acts or documents to be a 'sham', with whatever legal consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating. No unexpressed intentions of a 'shammer' affect the rights of a party whom he deceived."

137. The Snook statement was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Hitch v Stone [2001] EWCA Civ 63. Arden LJ stated at paragraph 63:

"It is of the essence of this type of sham transaction that the parties to a transaction intend to create one set of rights and obligations but do acts or enter into documents which they intend should give third parties, in this case the Revenue, or the court, the appearance of creating different rights and obligations."

138. In Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 Rimer J concluded that the principles laid down in Snook and Hitch v Stone (concerned with bilateral transactions) were applicable to a trust created by a disposition by a settlor to a trustee.

"When a settlor creates a settlement he purports to divest himself of assets in favour of the trustee, and the trustee accepts them on the basis of the trusts of the settlement. The settlor may have an unspoken intention that the assets are in fact to be treated as his own and that the trustee will accede to his every request on demand. But unless that intention is from the outset shared by the trustee (or later becomes so shared), I fail to see how the settlement can be regarded as a sham. Once the assets are vested in the trustee, they will be held on the declared trusts, and he is entitled to regard them as so held and to ignore any demands from the settlor as to how to deal with them. I cannot understand on what basis a third party could claim, merely by reference to the unilateral intentions of the settlor, that the settlement was a sham and that the assets in fact remained the settlor's property. One might as well say that an apparently outright gift made by a donor can subsequently be held to be a sham on the basis of some unspoken intention by the donor not to part with the property in it. But if the donee accepted the gift on the footing that it was a genuine gift, the donor's undeclared intentions cannot turn an ostensibly valid disposition of his property into no disposition at all. To set that sort of case up the donee must also be shown to be a party to the alleged sham. In my judgment, in the case of a settlement executed by a settlor and a trustee, it is insufficient in considering whether or not it is a sham to look merely at the intentions of the settlor. It is essential also to look at those of the trustee."

139. In A v A v St George's Trustees [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam), Munby J agreed with the decision and reasoning of Rimer J. He made a number of further points, including that the shamming intention must be present when the trust is purportedly created. A trust which is valid when created does not subsequently become a sham because the trustees and the settlor agree to ignore the terms of the trust. That is simply a breach of trust; no more and no less; see paragraph 42.

140. Determining whether the parties have a shamming intention is not a question of construction of the impugned document, but a matter on which extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove or disprove the existence of the requisite subjective intention. In determining whether the shamming intention was there at the outset it is therefore perfectly proper to consider how the parties have subsequently acted; National Westminster Bank plc v Jones [2001] 1 BCLC 98 at paragraph 42.

141. The shamming intention in an alleged "sham trust" requires both (a) an intention that the assets are to be held on different terms to those set out in the trust deed and (b) an intention to mislead others as to the true intention. The general rule is that, for a transaction to be a sham, all the parties to it must share the necessary intent. In the context of a "sham trust", a number of cases have concluded that a trustee who goes along with a sham with reckless indifference will have the necessary common shamming intention; see A v A at paragraph 50 to 52 for a review.

142. Intention is not the same as motive. All transactions are carried out for a reason. An improper motive, such as to put assets out of the reach of creditors, is not without more, proof of a sham. Such a motive can be fulfilled by a genuine transfer of the assets out of the ownership of the debtor. That is why there are statutory provisions such as section 239 and section 423 Insolvency Act 1986 which permit the court (where the conditions are satisfied) to clawback for the benefit of creditors some or all of the value lost to the debtor's estate by these genuine dispositions. If a trust is created, and the assets are intended to be held on the terms of the trusts expressed, then it is a valid trust even if the ulterior motive was that by creating the trust, assets would then not be available to creditors of the settlor.

143. In assessing the evidence as to the existence of the shamming intention, it is important to bear in mind the words of Neuberger J in National Westminster Bank plc v Jones at para [59]:

"there is a very strong presumption indeed that parties intend to be bound by the provisions of agreements into which they enter, and, even more, intend the agreements they enter into to take effect….

Because a finding of sham carries with it a finding of dishonesty, because innocent third parties may often rely upon the genuineness of a provision or an agreement, and because the court places great weight on the existence and provisions of a formally signed document, there is a strong and natural presumption against holding a provision or a document a sham."

144. A conclusion that a document, agreement or provision is a sham or pretence does not make it void, or of no effect, for all purposes. The parties will not be able to rely on it as representing the true position as to the rights and obligations they have created and the court is free to ignore it and determine what those rights actually are; see Re Yates (a bankrupt) [2005] BPIR 476 at paragraph 219. The court has some flexibility as to what the consequences should be. This is because where there is a sham the illegality principle is engaged.

145. "No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act". Lord Mansfield's statement in Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 is said to be the font of the illegality principle in English law. The question of what constitutes an "immoral or illegal" act for the purposes of the illegality principle was addressed by the Supreme Court in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2014] UKSC 55. Lord Sumption made clear that the principle applied not just to criminal acts, but also to quasi-criminal acts which engaged the public interest. The latter category "includes cases of dishonesty or corruption, which have always been regarded as engaging the public interest even in the context of purely civil disputes "; Les Laboratoires at paragraph 25. As Neuberger J observed in the quote above from National Westminster Bank v Jones, all shams involve a finding of dishonesty. Shams to dishonestly conceal assets from creditors have always been regarded as engaging the illegality principle; see e.g. Gascoigne v Gascoigne [1918] 1 KB 223, Tinker v Tinker [1970] P 136 at page 143, Tribe v Tribe [1996] Ch 107, Collier v Collier [2002] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph 48 and Re Yates [2005] BPIR 476 at paragraphs 250 and 251.

146. In Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 the Supreme Court swept away the previous reliance based approach to the illegality principle, but did not question the correctness of Lord Sumption's analysis in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc of what constitutes an act which engages the illegality principle. Any consideration of the consequences of a conclusion that there is a sham must now consider the trio of considerations identified in Lord Toulson's speech in Patel v Mirza. He summarised the way forward at paragraph 120:

"The essential rationale of the illegality doctrine is that it would be contrary to the public interest to enforce a claim if to do so would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system (or, possibly, certain aspects of public morality, the boundaries of which have never been made entirely clear and which do not arise for consideration in this case). In assessing whether the public interest would be harmed in that way, it is necessary (a) to consider the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim, (b) to consider any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact and (c) to consider whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts. Within that framework, various factors may be relevant, but it would be a mistake to suggest that the court is free to decide a case in an undisciplined way. The public interest is best served by a principled and transparent assessment of the considerations identified, rather by than the application of a formal approach capable of producing results which may appear arbitrary, unjust or disproportionate."

147. Illegality is an issue which the court can take of its own motion even where, as here, it is not pleaded; Otkitrie International v Urumov & Ors [2013] EWCA Civ 1196 at paragraph 11, Les Laboratoires at paragraph 23.'